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Abstract 
In this study a brief description of the policy options for the control of public 
enterprise under different market structures is presented. A critical examination of the 
drawbacks of some similar studies in the international literature is also endeavored. 
Moreover, using a number of suggested financial efficiency ratios a measurement of 
the efficiency of the state controlled enterprises for the time period 1978-1991 is 
attempted. The main conclusions drawn from this study are, that public owned 
enterprises exhibit continuously lower efficiency on average compared to the average 
efficiency of the industry sectors in which they belong for all the period of the study, 
competition contributes positively in increasing efficiency, but it is rather considered 
as a necessary condition than a sufficient condition for the attainment of the overall 
economic efficiency. Conversely, the ownership form appears to be of critical 
importance.   
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1. Introduction 
In recent times government policies involving the transfer of S.O.E. (State 
Owned Enterprises) from the Public to the Private sector have become the central 
issue of the policy debate. Domberger & Piggot (1986), suggest that privatization is 
associated with the desire for “smaller” government and it is a politically charged 
term used to describe almost any attempt to improve public sector performance.  
The reasons for the increasing popularity of the privatization measures all over 
the world can be easily described. S.O.E. has been proved wasteful and inefficient, 
producing at high cost low quality products and services. They are usually overstaffed 
as governments use them as a tool for the maintenance of macroeconomic goals such 
as low unemployment. Kikeri & Nellis (2002), argue that S.O.E. are often protected 
from competition and also instructed to keep their prices low, resulting in mounting 
financial losses. This in turn leads to bailouts and fiscal strains both on government 
budgets and to the banking system. Governments cover S.O.E. losses with fiscal 
transfers. This financing through the Banking system increase intermediation costs, 
reducing the private sector’s access to credit and endanger the overall financial sector 
viability.    
In the international literature there are conflicting evidences regarding the 
superiority of the one over the other ownership regime. A number of studies that 
support the superiority of public ownership are those of Meyer (1975), Yanker (1975), 
Lindsay (1975), Primeaux (1977), Edwards and Stevens (1978), Omran (2001).  
Some other studies, such as, Caves (1990), Dyck (1977), Wasserfallen & 
Muller (1998), Martin & Parker (1995), Bortoloti et. al. (1998), Newberry & Pollitt 
(1997), Bitros & Salamouris, (1993), Cragg & Dyck (1999), claim that private 
ownership leads to more efficient outcomes.  
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Also, as it follows from another set of empirical studies there is no difference 
in efficiency between private and public ownership and more specifically what is 
supported is that, the main factor that leads to increased efficiency in the use of 
resources is the existence of an adequately competitive environment irrespectively of 
the ownership structure (Domberger and Piggot, (1986), Dunshire et al., (1991), 
Borcherding et.al. (1982), Savas (1977), Vickers and Yarrow (1988), Spann (1977), 
Davies (1971, 1977), Kay and Thompson, (1986), Pryke, (1981), Hartley et. al. 
(1991), Marsh, (1991)). 
Therefore, the critical policy questions are whether, a) to transfer the 
ownership to the private sector, or b) to transfer the ownership together with policies 
for increased competition, or c) to expose the public enterprises into competition. The 
crucial question again is whether competition is a necessary or a sufficient condition 
to achieve efficiency.    
 The remaining part of this study is organized as follows. In the next section 
some theoretical and empirical issues on the privatization debate are described. Then, 
the methodology and the financial ratios employed are presented. The results obtained 
are analyzed and finally, we end to conclusions and policy implications.  
2. Some theoretical and empirical issues on the privatization debate 
For the maximization of social welfare it is necessary that both, S.O.E and 
private enterprises to attain maximization of the overall economic efficiency, 
(technical and allocative efficiency). An allocation is efficient if the existing resources 
in the economy cannot be reallocated without making somebody worse off even when 
lump – sum transfers are feasible. The necessary conditions for an efficient allocation 
include the marginal equivalences consistent with a competitive equilibrium. Under 
perfect competition the competitive forces of the market generate a pattern of resource 
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use, which approximates an optimal allocation. There are also two cases where the 
market seems to fail in its allocative role. The first is when there are increasing returns 
to scale in the production of particular commodities and the second is the 
externalities, where the marginal social benefit exceeds the marginal private benefit. 
The solution of these problems is related either with the public ownership of these 
natural monopolies or with the private ownership of these enterprises under 
regulation, which is applied by regulatory bodies, appointed by the government. It is 
obvious that no regulation of private monopoly enterprises is inefficient since does 
not provide the private monopolist with the incentives to achieve allocative efficiency. 
However the monopolist has an incentive to achieve technical efficiency. Diagram 1 
presents some of the most usual forms of ownership structure.  
The main argument for the support of public ownership is that social welfare 
is promoted mainly because public enterprises defend employment, use their power 
for income redistribution, and promote balanced development of the economy, 
promoting this way allocative efficiency. On the other hand public sector management 
does not behave in a way consistent with cost minimization since profit maximization 
is not a goal of primary importance. Given that the attainment of allocative efficiency 
that publicly controlled enterprises are trying to achieve, strongly prerequisites the 
achievement of technical efficiency (since otherwise they would waste scarce 
resources) we can say that public ownership would be a policy choice only if these 
enterprises could be technically efficient. 
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Diagram 1: Market structure and forms of ownership 
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During the post war period we observe the tendency the state to maintain full 
employment and income redistribution policies through the public enterprises of both 
monopoly and competitive sector of the economy. The experience acquired from the 
operation of public enterprises in the monopoly, oligopoly sector on efficiency issues 
is mixed. In some cases private firms perform better than the public ones while in 
others the opposite holds. Conversely, studies, which measure the comparative 
efficiency of public and private firms in the competitive sector of the economy show 
that on efficiency grounds private firms are more efficient than public owned ones. In 
our study, the same result seems to hold since for all the period of the study publicly 
controlled firms exhibit lower efficiency levels than the corresponding average firm 
of the industry these firms operate.  
  Before we proceed to the examination of the efficiency of S.O.E. in Greek 
manufacturing, it is interesting to refer to some imperfections of several studies which 
attempted to compare the performance of private and public enterprises. Many 
researchers consider some markets as competitive while this does not hold in practice. 
Studies such as Neumberg (1977), Pescatrice and Trapani (1980), Atkinson and 
Halvorsen (1986), De Alessi (1974, 1977), which dealt with the measurement of 
performance in electric utilities industry, Pier et al. (1974), in refuse collection, 
conserned firms which comprise geografical monopolies and therefore they did not 
compete directly among them. Hence, all the conclusions drawn from these studies 
are basicaly refered to comparisons of public and private enterprises in non 
competitive markets. These studies although they contribute in the examination of the 
consequences of the ownership structure in a non competitive environment do not 
contribute to any conclusion relative to role of ownership in competitive sectors. So 
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the results which support the superior importance of competition over the importance 
of the ownership structure should be threated with caution.  
Another set of studies dealing with the comparison of private versus public 
firms regard duopoly cases. Some of these studies are those of Forsyth and Hocking 
(1980), Jordan (1981), Davies, (1977, 1971), Pryke (1982), Kirby (1979), which 
measure the comparative efficiency of airlines, Caves and Cristensen (1980), Caves 
et. al. (1982), which are dealt with the comparison of railway companies. It is 
important to stress that these duopoly markets were treated in their analysis as 
competitive. As a consequence the results that support competition superiority as a 
basic determinant for economic efficiency to be considered as ambiguous. Vining and 
Boardman (1992) and Tzouanaki et. al. (2002) argue that in these markets there is no 
competition since many of the lines were not common for the companies under 
consideration but also it is observed increased regulation that to a great extent 
cancelled the competition in prices between the companies 
3. The performance of S.O.Es in competitive environment. 
Let us now examine the performance of enterprises which operate in 
competitive environment and their ownership structure is either mixed with the State 
to control the majority of the share capital, or enterprises which the State controls the 
total of the share capital. In both categories the state appoints the management of 
these enterprises. Hence, examining the performance of these firms over time we are 
able to conclude relative to whether these firms are achieving the economic efficiency 
of its both dimensions, technical and allocative. Comparing also, the average 
performance of these enterprises with the average performance of the industry in 
which they belong, we can reach conclusions for the superiority of one ownership 
structure over the other. 
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Three State banks, the Commercial Bank of Greece, the Ionian and Popular 
Bank of Greece and mainly the National Bank of Greece controlled for the period 
under examination (1978 – 1991) approximately the 80% of the banking sector works. 
Among others, one of their activities is the participation in the share capital of either 
financial or non-financial enterprises, which operate in several sectors of the 
economy. These enterprises were operating in the private sector before but due to 
their poor financial performance their ownership transferred to the public sector 
through the banking system. In our sample we strictly include those enterprises that 
National Bank of Greece control more than 50% of their share capital and operate in 
the competitive sectors of the economy.  
3.1. Methodology 
Our sample includes twenty-three State owned manufacturing enterprises that 
operated continuously in manufacturing from 1978 to 1991
1
. Using ratio analysis, the 
performance of sample enterprises is compared to the average efficiency of the 
industry sectors these firms belong. To ensure the higher comparability possible 
sample firms grouped into 10 two digit Standard Industrial Classification Industries, 
and the ratios divided by the number of firms. Then we compared their performance 
with the corresponding average two-digit industry level one 
2
.  
Considering that sample firms, had been continued to operate in the same 
industry sector after their transfer to the public sector, we draw conclusions relative to 
their comparative performance before and after the ownership transfer. More 
specifically, we examine whether indirect state control through the banking system 
has been proved to be an efficient policy measure in performance terms or not. Any 
variation in performance is attributed to differences in technical efficiency and by 
extension to the relative management efficiency of the different ownership regimes.   
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Financial statement analysts suggest that a plethora of financial ratios can be 
used as indicators of a firm's performance, none of which provides us with an 
adequate indicator of a firm's efficiency on its own. Hence, in this study by selecting a 
representative number of ratios, which reflect different dimensions of a firm's 
performance, we attempt to satisfy all the most important performance indicators. The 
selected financial ratios, which are used as performance measures, are defined as 
follows:  
 
Net Profits  
i) Return on Total Assets = 
Total Assets  
  
Net Profits  
ii) Net Profit Margin = 
Net Sales  
 
Salaries + other Employers Charges  
iii) Remuneration per Employee =  
Number of Employees  
 
Net Profits 
iv) Net Profit per Employee =  
Number of Employees  
 
Machinery Accumulated Depreciation 
v) Machinery Acc/ted Depreciation = 
Machinery before Depreciation 
 
Current Assets  
vi) Liquidity (Current Ratio) = 
Current Liabilities  
 
 
These financial ratios reflect respectively: Profitability (R.T.A., N.P.M.), 
employees’ performance and the relation between remuneration and productivity 
(N.P.E., R.E.), technological infrastructure 
3
, (M.A.D.) and liquidity position (C.R.). 
By implication, a high ranking in the most of the chosen ratios is considered, other 
things being equal, to reflect a strong financial position.  
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3.2. Results 
 The results obtained from the analysis of the selected ratios are quite 
interesting. State own enterprises appear to exhibit inferior efficiency compared to the 
efficiency of their private counterparts. As indicated in figures 1, 2 the R.T.A. and 
N.P.M. ratios are continuously negative for SOE for all the period of the study, taking 
their lowest value the period 1985 - 1986. It is important to observe that at the 
beginning of the period under consideration (1978), the average Industry performance 
was nearly equal to the average performance of S.O.E.  
Also the government stabilization program applied from 1985 to 1987 
contributed to the improved performance of public enterprises. However, the 
efficiency difference between the public enterprises and the average firm of the 
industry remain almost unaltered. These ratios clearly show us that state controlled 
enterprises are managed with a model, which diverge from the respective one of the 
private firms in economic efficiency terms. However, we should also note that the 
average private sectors profitability, although it is much better than S.O.E.’s one, 
indicates the acute problems of the Greek manufacturing, since from 1982 to 1987 
profitability was also negative for the average private enterprise.   
 One of the main reasons that provide explanation for the inferior performance 
of State Owned Enterprises is related to the cost of labour. The cost of labour as 
shown in figure 4 is continuously increasing for all the period of the study. The 
increase in wages had been exceeded the average labour cost increase of the industry. 
We should notice that the average remuneration cost was nearly the same for the year 
1980 
4 
for both S.O.E and private firms. Combining the above with the results 
presented in figure 3, where the profit per employee shows a significant deterioration 
for sample enterprises over time (especially for the time period 1983 to 1991) we can 
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realize the paradoxical phenomenon, of continuously increasing remuneration per 
employee while for the same time there is a continuously increasing loss per 
employee.  
 Conclusions relative to the level of technological infrastructure of the sample 
firms compared to the average industry level can be drawn from the machinery 
accumulated depreciation ratio (figure 5). It is shown that after 1980 sample 
enterprises renew with lower trend their technological infrastructure and consequently 
they have older technological equipment. Using this result with combination of the 
results drawn from figures 3, 4 we can argue that sample firms are becoming more 
labour intensive. 
 Finally, mixed results can be drawn from the liquidity ratio in figure 6. 
Therefore we cannot reach a valid conclusion relative to the superiority of the one-
ownrship structure over the other. More specifically the liquidity position of State 
controlled enterprises is similar to the average industry firm liquidity. However we 
should take into consideration that these firms belong to the National Bank of Greece 
therefore it is easier for them to have access in capital. This can explain the long 
living of these enterprises, which while they face acute financial problems they 
continue to operate.     
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Comparative analysis of S.O.E. and Industry financial ratios 
 
Figure 1
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Figure 4
REMUNARATION / EMPLOYEE
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
YEARS
(0
0
0
) 
D
rs
Sectors S.O.E.s
 
  
Figure 5
MACHINERY ACCUMULATED 
DEPRECIATION
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
YEARS
%
Sectors S.O.E.s
 
Figure 6
LIQUIDITY
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
1,4
1,6
78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
YEARS
%
Sectors S.O.E.s
 
 
 13 
Our results indicate that the transfer of enterprises from the private to the 
public sector through the banking system is not an effective policy measure since it 
does not lead these enterprises to increased efficiency levels. There is series of 
reasons that public ownership leads to inefficient results. The most important reason 
is that the state dictates to the management of the firm a number of policy elements 
such as price, investment, personnel policies etc. These policies very often diverge 
from the respective optimal private policies. This sometimes results to deficits for the 
public owned firms. State then subsidizes the deficits and the enterprises remain in the 
market. Many studies in the international bibliography refer losses subsidization by 
the state as the main reason that public sector management does not face the risk of 
bankruptcy and consequently assign low priority to cost reduction policies, 
Provopoulos (1985), Megginson et. al. (1986), Kotsogiannis and Makris, (2002).  
The deterioration of the financial position of the majority of the enterprises 
that were operating under the indirect control of the state, leaded to the creation of the 
Industrial Reconstruction Organization S.A. (IRO) 
5
. IRΟ companies can be grouped 
in four distinct categories with different characteristics. The first category concerns 
ex-private companies that their poor financial performance led them to the 
introduction to IRO. The second category concerns ex-private companies, which spent 
a period under IRΟ management, and they were transferred to the private sector 
afterwards. A third category concerns publicly owned companies that were introduced 
in IRΕ voluntarily. A fourth category concerns a number of companies that were 
established from IRΟ. This policy action prescribed from the persuasion of policy 
makers that IRO management would be equally or more efficient than the 
corresponding private management. This belief is supported from the fact that, all 
these companies spent a long time period under the control of the organization. The 
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results on performance of firms that run under IRO management are mixed since 
some of the enterprises bankrupted while some others finally were transferred to the 
private sector. 
 
4. Conclusions and policy implications 
Privatization policies are designed in order to substitute the single objective of 
maximizing profits for the typically mixed objectives of public enterprises, and 
exposure to the benefits and penalties of monitoring of the capital markets focusing 
on the task of raising revenues and lowering cost. The results of this study support the 
view that the indirect control of manufacturing firms that were operating in the 
competitive sector of the economy, by the state through the banking system was not 
an efficient policy measure since public owned firms exhibited lower efficiency than 
the corresponding average efficiency level of the Industry for all the study period. 
Considering nationalization of the inefficient enterprises as a measure to secure 
employment seem to be mistaken on two grounds. The most obvious result is the 
distortion of the competition in the market, and the second and more important is that 
it is not a permanent solution since these enterprises finally may bankrupt as the 
experience shows.  
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NOTES 
1.  The initial sample was significantly larger. However, data limitations restricted the 
analysis to the 23 finally chosen enterprises. A large amount of enterprises was also 
excluded from the sample since the percentage of their share capital controlled by 
National Bank of Greece was less than fifty per cent, while some others were 
excluded since they were not operating in the manufacturing sector. 
2.  The data used for the ratio calculations were derived from balance sheets and 
income statements of the sample enterprises while the data for the industry sectors 
collected from the National Statistical Service of Greece and from the Annual reports 
of the Industry, published from the Confederation of Greek Industries.  
3.  This ratio is included in the analysis, since it is considered as the most appropriate 
to measure the age of the technological infrastructure of a firm. This ratio indicates us 
how often a firm renews its production equipment.     
4. There are not available data for the average industrial sectors remuneration for the 
year 1978, 1979.  
5. The main task of this organization was to reconstruct “problematic” enterprises. 
The purpose for setting up this organization is clearly specified in the law 1386/08-
08-1983, article 2, paragraph 2, 3. Specifically, the main purpose of the organization 
is to contribute to the social and economic development of the country by a) the 
economic reform of the enterprises, which are members of the organization, b) the 
introduction and application of advanced foreign technology as well as with the 
development of local technology, c) the establishment and operation publicly owned 
enterprises or mixed economy enterprises. In the setting up law was provided that all 
these companies would be transferred to the private sector again after they have been 
reformed. 
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